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TOM BAKER and SEAN J. GRIFFITH. 2010. Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability
Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pp. viii + 285. $33.19 cloth.
This essay reviews the contributions to deterrence theory that Tom Baker and
Sean Griffith make in Ensuring Corporate Misconduct (2010) and argues that their
work highlights the limits of deterrence theory for shaping corporate conduct. Baker and
Griffith extend the deterrence framework to account for the mediating effect of thirdparty institutions, like insurers, on deterrence calculations, and they suggest how corporate governance decisions, such as what type of insurance coverage to purchase,
encode signals about corporations’ compliance motivations and capacity. Although these
insights might prove useful for enhancing the efficacy of deterrence regimes aimed at
white-collar crime and other types of corporate misconduct, they suggest the difficulty of
shaping corporate conduct that is influenced not only by the norms embodied in securities law, but also by the alternative normative system of shareholder value maximization. I discuss the failure of deterrence theory to address adequately noncompliant
behavior that springs not solely from material self-interest, but from adherence to an
alternative set of norms, and I explore the possibility of viewing corporate compliance
as a norm-change project.

INTRODUCTION
In Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, Tom Baker and Sean Griffith persuasively
argue that directors and officers (D&O) insurance, as it is currently structured, virtually
eliminates the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation on corporate misconduct. Their
analysis represents an important contribution to deterrence theory by extending this
framework to consider the mediating effect of third parties on deterrence calculations
and contemplating how information signals encoded in corporate insurance choices
might be leveraged to enhance the deterrent effects of a sanctions regime. At the same
time, however, their work suggests the limitations of deterrence for shaping corporate
conduct.

Jodi L. Short is an Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of Law and may be reached at
shortj@uchastings.edu. She thanks Tanina Rostain for organizing the generative workshop that led to this
symposium; Tom Baker and Sean Griffith for their provocative work and their generosity in inviting
interpretations of it; and Don Langevoort for his helpful insights on this review.
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From its beginnings (Beccaria [1764] 1986; Bentham [1789] 1988), through many
of its most sophisticated contemporary iterations (e.g., Ayres and Braithwaite 1992;
Haines 1997; Etienne 2011), the central problem for deterrence theory has been
securing conformance with collectively articulated norms in the face of contrary selfinterest. The problem with this framing is that it does not adequately address behavior
that is subject to multiple and conflicting normative frameworks. Behavior that transgresses the norms embodied in a given sanctions regime may not always spring from
self-interested calculations, but may instead arise out of allegiance to an alternative
normative system. Corporate financial behavior, for instance, is influenced not only by
the material self-interests of individuals and organizations, but by their adherence to the
collectively articulated and widely shared norm of shareholder value. Irrespective of
insurance arrangements, sanctions regimes that aim to deter corporate behavior that is
perceived to maximize shareholder wealth will have only limited effects unless they are
able to address this competing normative vision.
Baker and Griffith do not directly address the issue of norm conflict, instead
framing their analysis squarely within the rubric of deterrence theory. They begin from
the premise that the underlying purpose of shareholder litigation is to deter conduct on
the part of corporate actors that would harm investors. Investors who believe that they
have suffered losses due to illegal behavior by corporate actors may bring claims against
corporate officers and directors, or the corporation itself, under federal securities laws
or state corporate law. These claims are most commonly based on misrepresentation
theories alleging that corporate actors released false or misleading information that
induced investors to buy company shares at an artificially inflated price, resulting in
investor losses when the information was later revealed to be false (Loss and Seligman
2004). Baker and Griffith estimate that publicly traded companies have about a 2
percent chance of being the subject of the most common types of shareholder litigation
in any given year (Baker and Griffith 2010, 22). The average settlement value of such
claims in 2008 was more than $38 million. Since 2008, shareholder suits arising out
of the global financial crisis have sought enormous sums in compensation. Bank of
America shareholders, for instance, are seeking $10 billion in compensation for misleading statements that the bank made in connection with mortgage-backed securities.
The deterrence rationale for shareholder litigation is that the prospect of liability
will prevent individual corporate actors from engaging in actions prohibited by securities laws and will encourage corporate entities to adopt good governance practices to
ensure that their officers and directors comply. Deterrence theory posits that rational
actors will avoid harmful behavior when the expected costs of engaging in it exceed
whatever benefits it might produce (Bentham [1789] 1988; Becker 1968). The purpose
of shareholder litigation, from this perspective, is to attach sufficient costs to securities
law violations to make them prohibitively expensive to commit. As Baker and Griffith
describe the mechanism: “a prospective wrongdoer, recognizing that he or she will be
forced to pay the full cost of any harm he or she causes . . . therefore forswears the
harmful conduct” (Baker and Griffith 2010, 9).
Although this is how deterrence is supposed to work, the authors explain that
D&O insurance interrupts this mechanism. Standard D&O insurance coverage
arrangements will pay all the costs incurred by directors, officers, and the corporate
entity itself in defending and settling shareholder litigation (Baker and Griffith 2010,
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48).1 In a typical shareholder suit, this constitutes the vast majority of costs incurred by
insureds, as most shareholder litigation settles within policy limits (Baker and Griffith
2010, 10). The effect of these arrangements is to “[transfer] shareholder litigation risk
away from individual directors and officers and the corporations they manage to thirdparty insurers” (Baker and Griffith 2010, 10). Thus, the costs shareholder litigation
seeks to attach to legal violations are borne not by those individuals and entities whose
behavior it seeks to influence, but by their insurers. If corporate actors and the entity
that employs them are insulated from the costs of shareholder litigation, these costs are
unlikely to inform their decision making and deter law-breaking behavior.
The question Baker and Griffith ask in their book is whether the D&O insurers,
the entities that do bear these costs, are doing anything to prevent legal violations by
their insureds. The authors suggest that there are a number of ways in which insurers
might act as “deterrence mediators,” passing the costs (and thus the deterrent effects) of
shareholder litigation through to their insureds. First, D&O insurers could screen
potential insureds in advance for poor governance practices and price premiums based
on an assessment of liability risk. Second, for the duration of the policy, insurers might
monitor the governance practices of their insureds, educate insureds about best practices, and condition policy benefits on the adoption of these practices. Finally, on the
backend, D&O insurers can proactively manage the defense and settlement of shareholder claims to impose greater costs on corporate defendants who have engaged in
genuine wrongdoing. Currently, D&O insurers settle the vast majority of shareholder
claims without regard to their merits. Insurers could better incentivize law-abiding
behavior if they were more discriminating in their defense and settlement of claims, for
instance, by vigorously litigating (instead of settling) frivolous or weak shareholder
claims and by withholding insurance benefits from directors or officers found to have
engaged in actual fraud.2 Despite the deterrence mechanisms available to insurers,
Baker and Griffith’s extensive interviews with key participants in the D&O insurance
and securities litigation fields show that D&O insurers do little to pass through to their
insureds the deterrence signals sent by shareholder litigation. Under these circumstances, they conclude that D&O insurance “transforms” liability risk in ways that
“reduce or even destroy the deterrence function of shareholder litigation” (Baker and
Griffith 2010, 20).
Baker and Griffith argue, however, that these deterrent effects might be reconstituted through a combination of strategies that calls on D&O insurers to play a more
active deterrence role and leverages the structure of D&O policies as a mechanism for
identifying which corporate actors are most likely to have good-quality governance

1. The amount paid by the insurer excludes deductibles or coinsurance and is capped by the policy
limit. Baker and Griffith explain that these policy arrangements carry little, if any, deterrent effect because
deductibles are not risk rated to reflect the varying corporate governance quality of different insureds and the
vast majority of shareholder litigation settles within policy limits, so no additional out-of-pocket payments
are made by individual or corporate insureds.
2. Most D&O policies contain an explicit term that excludes policyholders from receiving insurance
benefits when they have actually engaged in fraud. “Because the core allegation of a great many shareholder
claims focuses on misrepresentations or fraud, robust application of the fraud exclusion would seem to enable
insurers to avoid payment for a large number of claims” (Baker and Griffith 2010, 186). As Baker and Griffith
explain, however, insurers rarely invoke this exclusion to deny coverage.
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systems in place. Baker and Griffith’s proposals include a restructuring of coverage to
exclude corporate entities (as opposed to individual corporate actors), a more active
role for insurers in the defense and settlement of claims that would reflect the culpability of corporate defendants, and a disclosure regime that would require corporations
to make public their D&O insurance coverage arrangements.
In their analysis of the problem and their prescriptions for reform, Baker and
Griffith make three important contributes to deterrence theory. First, they push beyond
deterrence theory’s traditional focus on regulators and regulated entities to illuminate
the ways in which the deterrence threat of legal sanctions is often mediated through
third-party institutions such as insurance companies. Second, they add to a small, but
growing, body of literature that seeks to leverage the deterrent effects of sanctioning
regimes by attending to the informational signals embedded in corporate governance
arrangements. Finally, although they meaningfully extend the deterrence framework,
Baker and Griffith’s analysis also highlights the inadequacies of a deterrence-based
approach to corporate misconduct that may itself be driven by the deeply ingrained,
alternative normative regime of shareholder value.

INTRODUCING INTERMEDIARIES INTO THE
DETERRENCE EQUATION
At least since Gary Becker’s (1968) foundational economic model, deterrence
theory has focused primarily on two actors: the sanction setter and the potential object
of the sanctions. The sanction setter calibrates punishment for a given transgression to
a particular magnitude and implements an enforcement regime that determines the
probabilities with which these punishments will be imposed. The target of a given
regulatory regime calculates the expected costs of being punished,3 weighs them against
the benefits of transgression, and selects the behavior that will produce the greatest net
benefit (Becker 1968). Baker and Griffith expand the universe of actors relevant to this
equation by demonstrating how the deterrent effects of legal sanctions are mediated
through institutional actors other than sanction setters and targets.
To be sure, the existing deterrence literature has long recognized that there are
many sources of mediating effects on the deterrence calculus. However, this literature
has focused almost exclusively on how sanction setters and targets themselves mediate
the objective properties of deterrence regimes. The studies in this literature fall into
three broad categories. First, researchers have addressed how the deterrence signals
embodied in law are filtered through the subjective perceptions of deterrence targets
(Waldo and Chiricos 1972; Geerken and Gove 1975; Gibbs 1975). Many studies have
shown that the deterrence calculus is distorted by cognitive biases that may cause
deterrence targets to discount the possibility of being apprehended (Shover 1996;
Horney and Marshall 1992; Tunnell 1992; Anderson 2002) and the severity of potential
legal punishments (Zimring and Hawkins 1973; McClelland and Alpert 1985; Apospori

3. Expected costs are a function of the sanction’s objective magnitude (severity), the likelihood that
it will be applied (certainty), and the swiftness (celerity) with which it will be applied (Gibbs 1975).
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and Alpert 1993; Anderson 2002; Kleck et al. 2005; Paternoster 2010) or to weigh the
benefits of rewards more heavily than the costs of penalties (Dugan and Chenoweth
2012). Deterrence targets’ perceptions are also mediated by social factors, like their
understandings and expectations about how peers perceive and respond to a given
sanctions regime (Gibbs 1978; Grasmick and Green 1980; Braithwaite 1989; Lott and
Mustard 1997).
A second body of research demonstrates how regulatory authorities, or sanction
setters, actively mediate the perceptions of regulatory targets through the design and
implementation of sanctions regimes (Gunningham, Thornton, and Kagan 2005;
Shimshack and Ward 2005; Kennedy 2009; Short and Toffel 2010). For instance,
researchers have suggested that the New York Police Department’s adoption of a
“zero-tolerance” policy for minor offenses such as panhandling and fare jumping was
designed not only to increase the objective probability of apprehending low-level
offenders, but to “serv[e] notice that the police were vigilant about all crime”
(Paternoster 2010, 791; Kelling and Coles 1996). Similarly, a study on environmental
self-policing found that polluting firms in heavily inspected industries improved their
compliance irrespective of their actual probability of being individually inspected
(Short and Toffel 2010). Studies have also shown that regulators can enhance the
perceived legitimacy and the practical efficacy of their sanctions regimes by inviting
public participation in their adoption and implementation (Tyler 2006).
Finally, a related body of literature examines how the objective properties of legal
deterrence regimes are mediated by the adoption and implementation practices of
deterrence targets themselves. Edelman (1992), for instance, shows how firms’ adoption
of standards and practices in the form of internal corporate compliance policies came to
shape legal understandings of what it means to comply with antidiscrimination law.
Subsequent studies have demonstrated how auto manufacturers used alternative dispute
resolution to redefine what it means to comply with consumer protection laws (Talesh
2009) and how schools helped construct the parameters of legal liability for peer sexual
harassment (Short 2006). Edelman and Suchman (1997) discuss the range of mechanisms through which regulated entities influence the subjective and objective properties
of the deterrence regimes that regulate them.
Although this literature has complicated and enriched the foundational deterrence model by examining how it is mediated by the practices and perceptions of
sanction setters and targets, it has paid relatively little attention to the ways these
practices and perceptions are also mediated by actors and institutions that are not the
immediate subjects or objects of the sanctioning regime (but see Edelman, Abraham,
and Erlanger 1992). This omission is glaring in light of the complex institutional
relationships that exist in contemporary regulatory regimes and the multifarious and
often prominent roles played by intermediaries like lawyers, auditors, raters, and media.
This has begun to change in the wake of recent financial crises that highlighted
the pivotal role these intermediaries played in shaping the practices and perceptions of
regulators and regulated entities in meeting and enforcing regulatory obligations. For
instance, scholars have discussed how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a financial reporting law
enacted in the wake of Enron’s collapse, relies heavily on the regulatory role of intermediaries like lawyers and accountants to monitor and certify the compliance of their
corporate clients (Bainbridge 2012).
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There is also a developing body of scholarship on how financial intermediaries
like credit rating agencies (CRAs) influenced the way regulators and regulated entities
perceived and responded to risky financial activities leading up to the global financial
crisis (Hill 2009; Partnoy 2009; Coffee 2011). Scholars have argued that CRAs helped
fuel the crisis by bestowing undeserved triple-A ratings on risky financial instruments
and have described how their role was amplified by the way they were embedded into
the financial regulatory system (Partnoy 2009). CRAs were originally designed to
assess and certify the quality of financial products on behalf of private investors, but
their role shifted as regulators began to incorporate ratings into various state and
federal regulatory schemes. For instance, regulators used CRA-generated ratings to
create indices measuring the quality of various financial instruments and the adequacy
of bank capital requirements. They then keyed to these indices a set of mandatory
investment rules that forced certain investors to purchase only highly-rated bonds.
These institutional arrangements constituted CRAs as de facto regulatory licensors
(Partnoy 2009) that unlocked markets and that shaped (if not defined) perceptions
among securities regulators and regulated corporations about what constituted safe and
law-compliant investments.
These kinds of layered institutional arrangements complicate the deterrence story
significantly. However, until now they have not been analyzed systematically from a
deterrence perspective. Baker and Griffith’s study not only describes the intricate
relationships between D&O insurers and the companies they insure, but demonstrates
how these relationships temper the potential deterrent effects of shareholder litigation.
The authors also recognize that these relationships could be structured differently and
that mediating institutions like insurance companies could amplify, or at least reconstitute, the deterrent effects of shareholder litigation. Their approach suggests important avenues for future research in this area.

LEVERAGING DETERRENCE THROUGH SIGNALS
Among their policy recommendations for restoring the deterrent effect of shareholder litigation, Baker and Griffith suggest a disclosure regime that would require
companies to make public the key terms of their D&O insurance policies. They argue
that:
Even if the cost of D&O insurance does not provide a sufficiently strong incentive
to spur a corporation to optimize its governance structure, the cost and structure of
a firm’s D&O coverage package nevertheless encodes important information about
its governance quality. Most basically, the more a corporation pays for its D&O
coverage package, all other things being equal, the greater the shareholder liability
risk it poses. (Baker and Griffith 2010, 203)
In other words, a company’s D&O insurance premium is a signal, or a “valuable proxy
for information that is not otherwise available” (Baker and Griffith 2010, 204). In
economic theory, signals communicate hidden information indirectly, through actions
rather than through explicit disclosure (Akerlof 1970; Daughety and Reinganum 2008).
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Baker and Griffith suggest that the disclosure of D&O insurance premiums would reveal
not only direct information about what those premiums are, but indirect information
about the quality of corporate governance at insured corporations, since higher premiums would mean that the insurer had judged the company to be at higher risk. In
jurisdictions where such disclosure is currently required, D&O insurance premiums
have, in fact, been found to be a significant predictor of corporate governance quality
(Core 2000).
Baker and Griffith suggest that if information about D&O premiums were more
widely available, it would be incorporated into the financial analyses of fund managers,
arbitrageurs, and other professional investors as a proxy for governance quality. These
analyses would discount the share price of firms perceived to have poor governance
practices and this increase in the cost of raising capital would prompt governance
improvements at these firms.
This approach adds to an emerging body of literature that seeks to leverage the
value of signals in deterrence regimes. Traditionally, deterrence theory has focused on
incentives, or the combination of costs and benefits that will induce compliant behavior.
Unfortunately, there are limits to the kinds of behavior that even well-designed incentive systems can reach. Although incentives can be valuable in shaping mutable
behavior that deterrence targets can readily choose and change, they are less effective
at addressing the more intractable characteristics of deterrence targets (Kirmani and
Rao 2000).
So, for instance, the incentives embodied in a deterrence regime may inform
corporate actors’ conscious deliberations about whether to comply with a given set of
legal obligations in a particular situation. However, incentives are less likely to alter (at
least in the near term) a corporation’s capacity to comply or its entrenched will not to.
Signals can mitigate this incentive gap in regulatory regimes. From the signaling
perspective, an entity’s behavior is not an object of regulation to be molded through
incentives, but an artifact of the entity’s unobservable intentions that reveals information about the type of entity it is (Akerlof 1970; Spence 1974; Meyer 1979; Posner
2000). Sorting entities by type can help regulators administering deterrence regimes to
target their enforcement resources at the individuals or entities that are most likely to
be noncompliant (Helland 1998).
Recent studies have explored how regulators might develop more finely grained
targeting heuristics to distinguish firms with the will and capacity to comply from their
less willing or able counterparts. They have suggested that firms’ behavior in response
to a given set of choices in a deterrence regime can reveal important information about
their motivation and capacity for compliance. For instance, Raskolnikov (2009) has
proposed a dual-track tax penalty regime that would identify cooperative and normatively motivated taxpayers by allowing them to opt into an enforcement regime with
draconian terms that would impose severe penalties for violations in a swift and certain
manner. The theory is that only taxpayers with the capacity and sincere intention to
comply with tax laws would opt into such a regime because they would be confident that
they would never be subjected to its penalties. By contrast, taxpayers who wished to
game the tax system more aggressively would remain outside the draconian regime
because running afoul of it would be too costly. Similarly, Toffel and Short (2011)
suggest that self-reported legal violations can help regulators identify firms that are
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effectively self-regulating their environmental compliance. They argue that unlike
firms’ positive disclosures about their participation in voluntary environmental programs, which often amount to nothing more than green-washing, disclosures of legal
violations carry a cost that firms without the will or capacity to self-regulate going
forward will not be willing to bear. In both cases, actions taken by deterrence targets—
selecting an enforcement regime or disclosing a legal transgression—convey information to regulators that may help them sort regulated firms by their compliance capacities
and motivations.
Similarly, firms’ choices about D&O insurance coverage, and insurers’ choices
about how to price this coverage, could provide securities regulators with information
that would help them target their enforcement resources. The insurance pricing information that Baker and Griffith argue would inform financial analysts’ assessment of
firms’ governance quality could likewise be used by regulators to identify which firms
lack the governance capacity to comply with their legal obligations. Similarly, firms’
choices about whether to purchase D&O insurance for the corporate entity, as well as
for individual officers and directors, might communicate hidden information about a
firm’s confidence in its ability to comply. This latter disclosure has the added benefit
of being more difficult to obscure with creative insurance packaging and pricing
arrangements. Both types of disclosures have the potential to reveal information that
would enhance the efficacy of existing corporate and securities law deterrence regimes
by identifying which companies are more or less likely to comply. And the proposal
highlights the importance more generally of attending to signaling effects in deterrence regimes.

THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE NORM AND THE LIMITS
OF DETERRENCE
Even as Baker and Griffith expand the boundaries of deterrence theory, their case
study illuminates its limits as applied to corporate conduct in the contemporary sociolegal context of US regulatory capitalism. Since its inception, deterrence theory has
assumed a clear dichotomy between right and wrong, compliance and transgression,
cooperation and defection. On one side of the deterrence equation is conformance with
collectively articulated norms; on the other is the pursuit of naked self-interest. Becarria
suggested that the “motivation to commit crime was found in ubiquitous self-interest”
and that these motives “had to be countered by punishments” (Paternoster 2010, 768).
Bentham similarly saw human behavior as “directed by the twin goals of the attainment
of pleasure and the avoidance of pain” (Paternoster 2010, 770).
The most influential contemporary deterrence paradigms retain the residue of this
foundational dichotomy, pitting the collective normative aspirations of the sanctions
regime against the material or hedonistic motivations of self-interested individuals. In
his breakthrough work To Punish or Persuade, John Braithwaite struggles to reconcile
warring perceptions of corporate actors as “basically good” or “essentially bad”
(Braithwaite 1985, 100), but he ultimately retains the dichotomy and complicates it
by suggesting that these two motivational states are situational rather than innate
(Braithwaite 1985, 100). In Responsive Regulation, Ayres and Braithwaite seek to
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develop a more complex understanding of corporate actors’ multiple and often conflicting motivations for behavior, but they nonetheless continue to characterize these
motivations as falling into the two dichotomous categories: law-compliant behavior is
driven by “a higher calling” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 24) or a concern “to do
what is right” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 22) and noncompliant behavior is driven
by “baser motivation” (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 25) like “economic interest”
(Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, 24). In economic models of deterrence, the choice of
whether to comply or not (Becker 1968), to cooperate or defect (Scholz 1984), is
likewise binary.
This stark dichotomy between normatively-driven compliance and calculativelydriven noncompliance fails to capture an important category of behavior: namely,
behavior that is subject to more than one norm. Corporate financial conduct (not
unlike many other kinds of conduct) is subject to multiple and potentially conflicting
normative systems (Boltanski and Thevenot 2006). Two are relevant to this discussion.
One set of norms is embodied in the federal securities laws, which broadly prohibit
fraudulent conduct like misstatements and misrepresentations in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities (Securities Exchange Act of 1934). The norms embodied
in this legal regime include honesty, fair dealing, and investor protection. Shareholder
litigation is one important mechanism for enforcing compliance with them.
A second normative system governing behavior in the contemporary corporation
is the maximization of shareholder value, narrowly conceived as wealth and often
operationalized as short-term, quarter-to-quarter gains. Although the precise contours
and normative desirability of the shareholder value norm are fiercely contested, it has
all the hallmarks of a robust normative system. First, the shareholder value norm has
been articulated not merely as a management or financial accounting philosophy, but in
explicitly normative (if not overtly moral) terms. Corporate managers are said to have
a normative obligation, or a “responsibility” to increase the wealth of shareholders
(Rappaport 1986, 1; Friedman 1970). Shareholder value maximization is also said to be
normatively desirable for the economy’s overall performance and for social welfare. It
has been widely argued that “when the corporate enterprise maximizes shareholder
value, everyone—workers, consumers, suppliers and distributors—will, as a result, be
better off” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, 27; Easterbrook and Fischel 1991). Based on
these premises, there has been a “rapid convergence on the standard shareholderoriented model as a normative view of corporate structure and governance” (Hansmann
and Kraakman 2001, 443, emphasis added).
Second, some version of the shareholder value norm is widely shared not only
among powerful corporate actors, but also among retail investors. Julia Ott (2009, 2011)
describes how the concerted efforts of the New York Stock Exchange made the United
States into a “mass investment society” in which the majority of US households own
financial securities (Ott 2011, 222) and she demonstrates how citizens’ experience of
stock ownership transformed their political consciousness into one that is broadly
supportive of the shareholder value norm. Before mass stock ownership, stock trading
was viewed by the public with suspicion and reproach: “Bonds, stocks, and the malefactors that traded them seemed to subvert the work ethic and to divert capital from
productive, entrepreneurial pursuits” (Ott 2009, 48). However, as the investing class
expanded, “citizen shareholders” began to see their interests as aligned with those of the
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stock and bond traders and began to see securities markets not as illicit gambling dens,
but as essential to the maintenance of foundational values like “liberty, democracy, and
individualism” (Ott 2009, 69).
Ott argues that before mass stock ownership, US debates about corporate accountability focused on “corporations’ proper relationship to consumers, employees, competitors, and local communities” (Ott 2011, 131–32). By contrast, as more and more
citizens became shareholders, corporate accountability was discussed almost exclusively
in terms of management’s responsibilities to shareholders (Ott 2011, 132). By the late
twentieth century, shareholders themselves, management theorists, and “even economic reformers conceded shareholder value as the benchmark for managerial performance” (Ott 2011, 223).
Third, the norm of shareholder value is not merely informal, but is embedded in
US corporate law (Bainbridge 1992; Mitchell 1993). To be sure, corporate law doctrine
encompasses other norms, most prominently contract and business judgment, that are
often in tension with shareholder value maximization orthodoxy and that allow corporate actors some amount of flexibility to consider nonshareholder-related interests of
the corporation.4 Nonetheless, shareholder value provides a foundational decisional
norm in corporate law. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. is often cited for its early articulation
of this norm and is widely taught in law schools (Stout 2008). In that case, the
Michigan Supreme Court invoked the shareholder value norm to prevent Henry Ford
from curtailing special dividends for shareholders in order to invest Ford’s large capital
surplus in new plants, increased production, expanded employment, and price reductions for consumers. The court explained:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end. The
discretion of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end,
and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to
the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.
Although there is an active debate about the importance of shareholder value
relative to other corporate law norms (Stout 2008, 2012), it continues to animate
decisions to the present day. For instance, the Delaware Chancery Court recently
invalidated a defensive voting rights plan that was adopted by the board of the online
classified ad forum, craigslist, to protect itself from the possibility of a hostile takeover
by its powerful minority shareholder, eBay. Craigslist claimed that it adopted the rights
plan to preserve the company’s corporate culture, which it characterized as a commitment to providing nonmonetized classified services to people across local, national, and
global communities. The court said that craigslist could not adopt defensive measures to
preserve its culture if that culture was not cultivated toward the end of producing value
for shareholders.
4. The business judgment rule, for instance, insulates directors from liability in the vast majority of
cases, even where they have acted without regard to shareholder wealth maximization, giving directors some
freedom to consider the interests of other stakeholders (Bainbridge 1992).

Deterring Corporate Misconduct

Having chosen a for-profit corporate form, the craigslist directors are bound by the
fiduciary duties and standards that accompany that form. Those standards include
acting to promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders.
The “Inc.” after the company name has to mean at least that. Thus, I cannot
accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a corporate policy
that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the economic value
of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. (eBay v.
Newmark 2010, 60–61)
The court enforced the norm of shareholder value even though eBay had invested in
craigslist with knowledge of that company’s commitment to free online community
service and had explicitly professed its support for these values in negotiating its
relationship with craigslist.
Fourth, apart from corporate law, there is a robust informal enforcement regime
that effectively promotes compliance with a market-driven, short-term version of the
shareholder value norm (Dallas 2011). Not only has the investor class expanded, as
described above, but it has become largely consolidated in large institutions like pension
funds and mutual funds, which control around 70 percent of the publicly traded shares
in the United States (Strine 2010, 10). This gives institutional investors tremendous
leverage to enforce their perceived interests. As it turns out, the agenda of institutional
shareholders “has not involved a keen focus on the avoidance of excessive risk, the
avoidance of firm failure, and an emphasis on long-term growth. It has been on
increasing stock prices as fast and as much as possible, even if that requires financial
gimmickry and risk” (Strine 2010, 17). Institutional investors, as well as arbitrageurs
and hedge fund managers that share this agenda, have used their massive market power,
as well as the market for corporate control, to discipline corporate management that
fails to pursue short-term share price maximization strategies. The effect of these
enforcement mechanisms is to raise the cost of capital for nonconforming corporations
and to eject nonconforming managers from their positions.5 The result is a brutally
effective deterrence regime that imposes swift, certain, and significant costs on corporations and managers that violate the shareholder value norm, at least as it is conceived
by these powerful shareholders.
Finally, shareholder value is normative in the sense that it “is central to management’s socialization” (Bainbridge 1992, 1441), defining a social role, or identity, for
corporate actors that fundamentally shapes and constrains their conceptions of appropriate behavior and the meanings they attribute to their actions. “[P]eople’s conception
of appropriate action and even of their ‘interest’ is very much a function of the
particular social role in which they find themselves” (Sunstein 1996, 911–12). Many
leading corporate law scholars and advocates have suggested that management pursued
the high-risk/high-return strategies that fueled the global financial crisis, at least in part,
5. In fact, a similar dynamic appears to be disciplining insurers’ behavior with respect to their corporate
clients. Baker and Griffith suggest that the primary reason insurers do not pass through deterrence signals to
their insureds in the form of more active risk management practices is that corporate clients do not want
these services from their insurers and will purchase their coverage from insurers who do not force clients to
accept them. Insurers are, in other words, making their own bottom-line calculations that they stand to lose
more in premiums than they stand to gain with better risk management.
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because they saw their role as serving the interests of shareholders who validated these
strategies (Lipton, Lorsch, and Mirvis 2009; Bratton and Wachter 2010). Martin
Lipton, a leading corporate lawyer, has suggested that managers’ actions leading up to
the financial crisis were shaped and constrained by shareholders who “pushed companies to generate returns at levels that were not sustainable” (Lipton, Lorsch, and Mirvis
2009). Leo E. Strine, a prominent member of the Delaware Court of Chancery, argues
that it is difficult for corporate managers to avoid excessive risk taking in the face of
shareholder expectations: “why should we expect corporations to chart a sound longterm course of economic growth, if the so-called investors who determine the fate of
their managers do not themselves act or think with the long term in mind?” (Strine
2010, 1–2). The American Bar Association has suggested that the short-term focus of
the most powerful shareholders may literally “impede the capacity of the corporation”
to make “long-term investments and decisions necessary for sustainable wealth creation” (American Bar Association 2009).
Of course, the shareholder value norm is very much entwined with material
self-interest, both in its theoretical genealogy and in the institutional arrangements of
the modern corporation. It is based on neoclassical economic theories of efficiency and
welfare maximization that are, themselves, grounded in the pursuit of rational, individual self-interest. And, as a practical matter, compensation arrangements at many
companies give corporate managers a “personal interest in boosting the market value
of their companies’ stock” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, 25). But the presence of
individual or material interests hardly disqualifies a system of beliefs as normative.
Shareholder value, like other normative frameworks, purports to provide a vision of the
“substantive ‘good’ ” toward which corporations and their agents should strive
(Mitchell 1993, 1481; McCall 2011). It forms a key part of what has been characterized
as a broader “business morality” that often stands in tension with “the morals applicable
outside the marketplace” (Mitchell 1993, 1484). Even if there are cogent moral objections to be made to the norms embodied in shareholder value maximization, it is
dangerous to dismiss them as non-normative.
My contention in this essay is that the challenge for securities law deterrence
regimes runs much deeper than the distortionary insurance arrangements identified by
Baker and Griffith. Even if the incentives created by D&O insurance are realigned in
accordance with Baker and Griffith’s suggestions, securities law deterrence regimes are
potentially undermined by shareholder value norms that exert a powerful, independent
influence on the behavior of corporate actors. The shareholder value norm, at least as
it has been articulated and enforced by the most powerful shareholders, is in tension
with, and sometimes in outright conflict with, the norms embodied in securities law
deterrence regimes. Of course, these two sets of norms are designed to, and often do,
reinforce one another. Antifraud statutes are designed to protect the investments of
shareholders by ensuring that they are based on the true value of the corporation, not
on the chicanery of its executives, and in many (perhaps most) contexts, these two sets
of norms pull in the same direction. Under these circumstances, there will be few
violations of law and those that occur will be of the type traditionally addressed by
deterrence regimes: bad actors transgressing collectively articulated norms for personal
gain. However, there are also numerous situations in which the two normative regimes
are in tension with one another. For instance, a corporate executive’s decision to inflate
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an earnings report to meet quarterly projections will often be driven by a normative
sense of obligation to produce gains for shareholders (Dallas 2002), as opposed to (or in
addition to) any material calculation to transgress antifraud norms for personal gain.
The decision to abide by one set of norms instead of another is qualitatively
different than the decision to transgress a unitary set of norms in favor of “baser
motivation” like material self-interest. If some significant subset of securities law violations are motivated, at least in part, by what I have characterized here as the normative considerations of shareholder value, then it is necessary to develop an enforcement
strategy that goes beyond simple deterrence to address these conflicting norms.
Although the development of such a strategy is beyond the scope of this essay, I
conclude with a brief survey of the literature on the use of law to change social norms
and explore the challenges and possibilities of viewing corporate and securities law as a
“norm change” project rather than a straightforward deterrence project.
Norm change regulation recognizes that noncompliant behavior often results not
from a decision to deviate from a unitary set of norms based on a calculation of costs and
benefits of deviation, but from a decision to obey one set of norms rather than another.
This kind of normative multiplicity in motivations presents at least three distinct sets
of challenges for the deterrence framework. First, the existence of conflicting norms
makes it difficult, even for actors with the purest of motivations, to comply with all their
social and legal obligations, or “to figure out what the ‘right’ action is” (Babcock 2009,
956). This “noise” about appropriate behavior significantly complicates what is already
a fraught path from sanction to deterrence.
Second, decisions made on the terrain of what is “right” or “appropriate” in a given
situation are less susceptible to molding through the incentives of deterrence regimes
(Bernstein and Cashore 2007). Normatively motivated decisions are often characterized precisely by their disregard of the material costs and benefits of the action. For
instance, the motivation for dueling among elite gentlemen in the antebellum US
South has been characterized as a readiness to seek honor-based vengeance “without
regard to the balance of costs and benefits” (Posner and Rasmusen 1999, 382). Even the
most exquisitely designed and implemented deterrence regime cannot reach behavior
that eschews cost-benefit calculation (Posner and Rasmusen 1999, 382).
Finally, the imposition of sanctions for violating one set of norms might actually
serve to reinforce the competing set of norms motivating the behavior. For instance, a
southern gentleman’s willingness to suffer legal penalties for dueling to defend his honor
may have had the perverse effect of enhancing his social status and reputational rewards
(Posner and Rasmusen 1999). Dan Kahan describes a similar dynamic afflicting antigun
programs in inner-city public schools. He describes how, among certain social groups,
“[p]ossessing a gun confers status because it expresses confidence and a willingness to
defy authority” (Kahan 1997, 363). In such a social context, deterrence policies usually
fail because “when authorities aggressively seek out and punish students who possess
weapons, their behavior reinforces the message of defiance associated with guns”
(Kahan 1997, 364). In both cases, not only do sanctions have no deterrent effect, but
they also serve to amplify the social status of the undesirable behavior conferred by the
competing norm.
In sum, when an entrenched norm is motivating behavior, simple deterrence is
not enough to change the behavior and may actually be counterproductive. Instead,
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regulators who wish to alter such behavior must change the social meanings associated
with the behavior (Lessig 1995; Sunstein 1996; Vandenbergh 2004). “If, for example,
smokers seem like pitiful dupes rather than exciting daredevils, the incidence of
smoking will go down. If people who fail to recycle are seen as oddballs, more people
will recycle” (Sunstein 1996, 911). The norm change literature contains numerous
examples of regulatory interventions that have changed the social meanings of normatively motivated behaviors. For instance, regulatory interventions that barred southern
gentlemen from public office for dueling tended to be more effective than those that
imposed fines or jail time because these men saw the public office bar as compromising
rather than enhancing their honor (Lessig 1995). Restrictions on smoking in public
places changed peoples’ habits and experiences in ways that reinforced messages about
the dangers of smoking to nonsmokers and transformed social meanings about the social
status of smoking (Lessig 1995). It was seen as less glamorous to stand outside smoking
in the rain than to do so sitting at dinner, sipping cognac. Regulatory interventions
aimed at reducing the spread of AIDS through risky sexual behaviors began to succeed
only when they addressed the deep normative roots of these behaviors and their role in
constituting gay male identities.6 They did so by enlisting participants in risky sexual
subcultures as “norm entrepreneurs” to educate and persuade their peers on the normative value of safer sex practices in ways that reinforced rather than undermined these
identities (Lessig 1995).
These kinds of norm change interventions rely on a constellation of techniques
that includes education and persuasion (especially by peers or insiders); time, place, and
manner restrictions on the normatively motivated behavior; and the expression of
alternative norms through law (Lessig 1995; Sunstein 1996; Babcock 2009; Feldman
2011). It is worth thinking about whether and how norm change strategies might be
adapted to engage the shareholder value norm and change the social meaning of the
corporate conduct it motivates.7 Prominent corporate law scholars have described the
community of corporate actors as one that is norm driven: “surprisingly small and
close-knit” (Rock 1997, 1013), deeply concerned about reputation (Skeel 2001), and
responsive to the “sermonizing” of Delaware Chancery Court judges, who “preach”
about appropriate behavior for corporate managers and directors (Rock 1997, 1016;
Fairfax 2005). These characteristics suggest that there are real opportunities to engage,
clarify, and, if necessary, revise the norms that govern the community.
Some Chancery Court judges as well as prominent academics and corporate law
insiders have, indeed, preached about the evils of short-term shareholder value, arguing
that it actually undermines the interests of most shareholders. Chancellor Strine, for
instance, has admonished that the focus of institutional investors “on quarterly earnings
and other short-term metrics is fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives of most
of their end-user investors, people saving primarily for two purposes, to put their kids
through college and to fund their own retirements” (Strine 2010, 12). Stout (2012)
6. See Bersani (1987) on the normative content of promiscuity in certain communities of gay men.
7. The corporate law literature already recognizes the central importance of norms in shaping the
behavior of corporate actors (Rock and Wachter 2001). However, this recognition has most commonly been
invoked to suggest that norms facilitate private ordering within and among corporate actors, rendering legal
interventions ineffectual or unnecessary (Black 2001; Blair and Stout 2001; Milhaupt 2001; Rock and
Wachter 2001) rather than to explore how these norms might be changed by law.
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cautions that the idea of “shareholder value” is dangerously misleading because companies that espouse this norm as the lodestar governing their decisions tend to do more
harm than good for their investors. Bratton (2002) has argued that Enron’s relentless
focus on short-term share price gains caused it to misjudge the economics of transactions that led to the firm’s collapse, causing devastating losses for its investors.
There is some evidence that alternative normative visions are influencing corporate boardrooms. Fairfax (2005), for instance, documents how pervasive sermonizing
about the alternative norm of “stakeholder value,” or the view that corporations have
responsibilities to a broader range of stakeholders beyond shareholders, has shaped the
way that corporate actors talk about their obligations. But it is far from clear that this
kind of sermonizing has changed the actions, motivations, fundamental understandings,
or normative orientations of the broader corporate community. Further research is
necessary to determine precisely how shareholder value norms influence corporate
behavior, what exactly those norms mean to corporate actors, and what kind of influence competing normative visions have.
In the meantime, the norm change perspective on financial regulation responds to
Baker and Griffith’s concern that shareholder litigation has no justification if it fails to
deter. Even if shareholder suits fail to prevent the targeted conduct in the near term,
they offer opportunities to express alternative norms through law. Deterrence regimes
and the standards of behavior they articulate can educate people about what type of
behavior is socially and morally appropriate and potentially change “people’s moral
evaluation of an act” (Feldman 2011, 21; Sunstein 1996). These messages should be
particularly powerful coming from shareholders themselves.

CONCLUSION
Deterrence theory has only begun to incorporate insights about norm conflicts
(e.g., Gezelius 2002; Parker 2006; Etienne 2011; Nielsen and Parker 2012) and has yet
to do so in any sustained or systematic way. This omission may spring not only from the
theory’s grounding in the tension between collective norms and individual self-interest,
discussed above, but also from a broader disinclination on the part of many social
scientists to characterize market behavior as normative (rather than self-interested).
Although there may be sound disciplinary or political reasons for declining to characterize market behavior as normative, the failure to do so seriously undermines the
possibility of regulating it. Addressing the kinds of behaviors that securities laws seek to
deter entails not only individual behavior adjustment through the proper calibration of
incentives, but also a collective reassessment of the broadly accepted shareholder value
norms that support these individual behaviors. Until that happens, corporate misconduct will be ensured.
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